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political partes and political development
syrja ake tune .
In' • notion
Found within most political systems today are some forms of
political party or parties. Although political parties started as a
Western phenomenon and reached their modem development in the West,
parties today can be found in most countries throughout the world
whether communist, socialist, or capitalist. The Middle East1 is no
exception to this general pattern, perhaps carrying it to extremes in
types and numbers of parties.
TMs paper will be an attempt to compare two Middle East
countries, Syria and Tunisia, with highly different political systems,
and to look specifically at political parties and their relationship
to the awesome problem of political development in these two countries,
Although much work has been done concerning political parties and
political development, it is still not known what form of party or
parties will contribute most effectively to the area of political
development. While realizing that no two political cultures are the
same and thus no one set of guidelines can be produced to follow for
the advancement of political development, hopefully the analysis in
*The Middle East as spoken of in this paper includes the
countries stretching re Iraq westward to Morocco, i.e., the Arab
countries of Southwest Asia, Egypt, Libya, Israel, and the Maghreb
countries of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco,
2this paper will at loast illuminate somo of tho characteristics,
whether positive or negative, that political parties can have in tho
process of political dovolopment.
Within the Middle Eastom countries can be found many divisive
societal factors which are related directly to politics. These factors
include strong tradition, an unbalanced ratio of urban-rural popula-
tion, class, varying ethnic background, and strong sectional tendencies.
With such vast differences stemming from these factors, the countries
of the Middle East are in the precarious position of having internal
upheavals occur all too frequently. One of the basic reasons for
choosing Syria and Tunisia in this study is that Syria exemplifies most
of the factors above, while Tunisia either has not been confronted as
strongly by these factors or has been able to overcome many of them
and has remained stable over the last decade. Another reason for
dealing with these two countries is that both share the general char-
acteristics of Arab countries, practicing the Islamic religion to some
degree, having had the same colonial ruler, and having been affected
by the Arab nationalist movement, although this latter aspect is more
true of Syria than Tunisia.
Party growth and political development in Syria and Tunisia
cannot be separated from the rise of nationalism which began around
the beginning of the twentieth century in these areas. Consequently,
rationalism became a major factor on the political scene. But here
one should distinguish between two nationalist movements which
3dovelopod in tho Middle East. The first embodied the idea of
indopondonce for the indi-'onous populations residing in cortain geo-
graphic aroas. Tunisia gives an excellent example of this type of
nationalist movement, especially since its geographic boundaries tended
to be natural boundaries—a situation far different from that found in
Syria.
.;ocond nationalist movement is a broader movement commonly
called Arab Nationalism. Its beginnings are rather nebulous, but
during the Second World War the movement was given impetus by the
Fertile Crescent Plan of Kuri al-Sa'id of Iraq and the Greater Syria
Plan advocated by Amir 'Abdallah of Trans-Jordan. The Arab nationalist
movement has been and is at least part of the basis of several parties
in Syria, while the movement's effects have not been so far-reaching
in Tunisia. Though the leadership of this movement is now split
between President Nasir of Egypt and the ruling Ea'th party of Syria,
it perhaps remains the strongest force in the politics of Syria.
Syria achieved independence in 19^1, although its position in
regards to France remained unsettled until 194-6. Tunisia was granted
independence by the French in 1956 after gaining autonomy in 1955. The
problems both countries encountered before independence are well reflected
in their actions since independence, although the problems were of
different types and consequently had dissimilar effects for political
development.
The following section sets up a framework of analysis. After
thi« f there will be sections dealing witb Syria and Tunisia respectively,
followed by some concluding : .. .j.
Political Parties and Political Development
Political Parties : A Definition
Political parties, since the beginnings of their modern existence
some two hundred years ago, have been defined in a continuing prolif-
eration of terms and concepts. Some of these definitions stress what
appears to be akin to the structural aspects of parties, while others
tend to be more concerned with the functional aspects related to parties.
Joseph La Palombara gives a definition of parties which combines the
structural and functional aspects to a certain degree, although the
stronger emphasis is on functions, when he refers to a political party
as an organisation that is articulated somewhat locally, that interacts
xvrith and seeks electoral support of the general public, that plays a
role in political recruitment, and that is committed to the capture or
maintenance of power, either alone or in coalition. 2 In contrast to
this definition, others will define a political party as anything which
labels itself as such. These two widely separated definitions should
point to the fact that anyone dealing with political parties must
reach some consensus on the definition of a political party. Therefore,
the minimum components required for an organization to be classified
as a political party will be developed in the following several pages.
Organisation is the required condition for any political party
to exist. Without organisation, no political party can come into being,
^'Introduction, " Politic?" ; i Political Development
,
cd. Joseph La and Myi . . / [Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1966), p. 27.
5and onco a party loses organization it fails to act both functionally
and structurally—though idoas may bo carried on. This necessity for
organization stems from a strong need in the human environment for the
unorganized group to develop organization to become effective in society.
However, as Kenneth Boulding points out, where there has been no pre-
vious consciousness of group solidarity (the group being the unorganized
subpopulation of persons that exists as a social fact because of its
presence in the image of the persons concerned as a significant classi-
fication of the total population) it is possible for the organization
itself to create the group or groups that it expresses and embodies.
3
Within organizations are found both solidarity and cooperation.
Cooperation is related to organizations through the integration of
diversified perspectives. Harold Lasswell observes that when opera-
tions are the primary aspects of organizations, coordination becomes
purely mechanical. But when a closer relationship exists between
cooperation and solidarity, cooperation becomes "doing" together, while
solidarity becomes "thinking" and "feeling" together.
^
For an organization such as a political party to exhibit
solidarity, the members of the organization must take into account the
perspectives of others, identify with the others, and be interested in
3i:enneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense : sneral Theory
(New York: Harper and Row,1 Publisher, 1963), p. 1A5.
^Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A
**
:
for Political Inquiry
. Haven: ralTuniversity Press.""
i9o5JTp7 30.
6other people's interests.-5 No doubt within disparate types of political
parties solidarity will fluctuate to varying decrees. In strongly .
ideological parties compatibility appears to become the major means of
solidarity, with facilitation playing a secondary and minor role.
Giovanni Sartori supports this idea when speaking of Communist organi-
zations, "Marxist ideology is in itself a formidable communication
stopper,
... a stable Communist orientation is closely related to the
ability of the party's organizational network to produce a culturally
manipulated isolation of given social groups in given areas."^ Sartori
continues when speaking of a fragmented party system, "Since most parties
have no prospect of xrijining a majority, each party—except eventually
the leading party—is more interested in securing for itself a stable
electorate of ideologically safe believers, than tempted to run the
risk of becoming an open party of the non-ideological variety."? In
the case of a pragmatic party,
-the opposite may be true, i.e., facili-
tation among groups becomes the overriding aspect of solidarity.
Up to this point a party is an organization in which varying
degrees of solidarity and cooperation are found. To this concept one
further aspect must be added which distinguishes political parties
from other organisations. Political parties must in some sense be
ftcbid
. . p. 31.
Giovanni Sartori, ; an Political Parties: The Case of
I olariaed Pluralism,
»
Political Dsv
"
opment ed
La. Palombara and VJsiner, p. 15J.
7IMd., P. 159.
7connected with and involved in the electoral process. In other words,
there must be a desire on the part of the organization to seek supporters
at the polls and in the election process, or at least strive in seme
manner for popular support. Seymour Martin Lipset has broadened this
latter aspect of political parties to include the idea of taking part
in public affairs.
Synthesizing the above brings about this minimal definition of
a political party: 1) a political party is an organization where some
degree of solidarity and cooperation is found, and, 2) where there is
a conscious effort on the part of the organization to gain electoral
and/or popular support. Though this definition is not astrict, it is
one which can be utilized effectively in party analysis. With this
definition in hand, attention is now turned to the relationship of
political parties to political development.
"•'-'" •'•. '-" -~
-'
-.•."-.;-.ragnt
What is political development? Though many definitions can be
found dealing with political development, the discussion presented by
Lucian Pye in Political Culture and Political Development? will form
the basis of political development as used in this paper. He establishes
three important components in the process of political development:
8Seymour Martin Lipset, "Party Systems and the Representation
of Social Groups," in Fo?; 1
_^: Contemporary Trends and Ideas ,
ed. Roy C. Ilacridis (::. York: [arper and Sow, Publishers, 19o?j\ p. 68.
^''Introduction," Political Culture and Political D anient , ed.
Lucian W. Pye and Sidney V ceton: Princeton University Press,
1965), pp. 13-17.
31) the organization of tho political system is characterized by greater
structural difforention and functional specificity and hotter integra-
tion of all the participating organizations and groups, 2) systemic
performance is marked by a greater capacity to cope with demands,
control conflict, and manage public affairs, and, 3) the population as
a whole is changing from a subject to a contributing status marked by
greater participation, equality, and acceptance of universal laws.
Classification and Operational Aspects
In political development, parties can be viewed from two
alternative perspectives. From one view parties can be seen as the
outgrowth of the development process, i.e. the culmination of processes
of social, economic, and political change. Parties here are seen as
the result of other developments. Parties, in the second outlook,
can be observed as independent variables affecting political develop-
ment itself. Thus the kind of parties x*hich have materialized may to
a large degree affect the capacity of the entire system to come to
grips with the crises of integration, participation, or distribution. 10
The above two points are hard to separate in reality, though it may be
said that the first point appears to be closely connected with socio-
economic factors such as literacy, Industrialization, and urbanization.
Political parties emerge in political systems when those who
seek, win, or maintain political power are required to gain larger
public support. This can come about in two ways. First, if citizens
iCLa Palonibara and Weiner, oj>. cit.
, p. kl.
9ohange their attitude toward authority, individuals nay beliovo they
havo the right to influonco tho exerciso of power. Second, if the
dominant or aspiring elito soek to win public support so as to gain or
maintain power, a non-participant population may be brought into
11politics. x Eoth of these points can be used to further political
development. But both points also can be used so as to be detrimental
to political development.
These two ideas are tied to the political socialization performed
by political parties. Corresponding to the first point is the idea of
initiating significant change in the existing political patterns. The
second point can reinforce the existing political culture, providing
continuity but enhancing participation. But many of the parties ap-
pearing in nations with strong traditional and ethnic subcultures
appear, however, to be reinforcing divisive particularism. 12 It is
hard for the Kiddle East to escape this tendency because of its strong
traditional and ethnic subcultures.
Political parties can bo classified in many different ways.
Helpful in developmental analysis is the idea of mobilist and adaptive
parties. Although there is a difference between the two, it is not as
distinct as one might like. Generally, a mobilist party is interested
in effecting behavioral and attitudinal change within society, while
adaptive parties focus their attention on adapting to public attitudes
1:LIbid
., p. 19.
12
"Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. , Comparative
Politics : AD" . ,;; or. t. '. piroaeh (Boston: Little, Erown and Company.
1966), p. 12i:
10
in the hopo of gaining support. Although mobilist parties also seek to
gain support and adaptive partios try to influence public opinion, the
two groups appear to approach 1 .ter from basically opposite ends.
The mobilist party is more ideologically-oriented whilo tho adaptive
parties have a more pragmatic approach.
ieh position a party "bakes has tremendous influence upon
political development. Tho mobilist position tends to push the sys-
tem one way or another. At times it pushes too hard overloading the
system beyond its capacity. Consequently, this brings about instability
and impedes development.
Aside from the mobilist and adaptive classification of parties,
another worthwhile distinction can be made between competitive and non-
competitive parties. Immediately, it should be seen that competitive
and non-competitive parties relate directly to the system in which they
operate. Myron Weiner and Joseph La Palombara point out that competi-
tive-party systems appear to materialize naturally and logically in
societies where the pressure to create party organizations initially
was felt in the legislature. i 3 This seems to be a basic Western tenet,
but is it applicable to a newly emerging nation? If the foundation,
i.e., the essence with the legislative structure, has not been laid
in these countries, it appears impossible for parties to develop
internally.
-Ca Palombara and VJeiner, oo. cit.
, p. 2?.
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The two scholars mentioned above view externally created parties
as a major threat to the contir tion and development of a competitive
system for several reasons. . t, externally created mass parties
sometimes develop a total ideologj for society that often excludes a
vtillingnoss to tolerate opposition. Second, the development of ex-
ternally created mass parties tends toward a radicalization and inten-
sification of the competitive process itself. Third, the fact that
these parties are created outside the context of legislative institu-
tions tends to make their identification with these institutions
-weak.
1
From the foregoing, two important points can be made for parties
and political development. The first is that internally created parties
enhance stability and development, but undoubtedly much of the develop-
ment must already have taken place within these systems. Secondly,
externally created parties in general lead to instability and cause a
problem for development. But here a paradox arises. If a country
lacks either the essence and/or -the structure, from where are political
parties supposed to come? If parties cannot be internally developed,
there are only two alternatives open for the system. Either external
party development takes place or party development must be manipulated
by the ruling elite of the system. Since most newly-emergent, develop-
ing nations do not contain both the structure and essence required for
internal party development, evidently these new nations are placed in
a serious predicament not easily overcome. Thus the choices open to
14Ibid.
. p. 2?.
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then are largely external party development or government manipulation
and control.
Government control and manipulation of parties often leads to
total party repression on the part of the ruling elite. Though this
may tend to stabilize society and help in economic grcwth, this action
does little to help build political participation, aggregation, articu-
lation, or socialization. Parties that are totally repressed become
clandestine and conspiratorial in character. If they survive, these
parties affect long-range political development even if they are allowed
to re-emerge from the shadows of illegality. It is "assumed therefore
that in almost all places where parties are totally suppressed the
ruling military and/or bureaucratic oligarchies have created conditions
15
of great potential political instability." Exceptions to this assump-
tion exist, e.g. Bourguiba ! s Tunisia, but in most cases it has been
an accurate observation.
Party repression by the government is usually the result of
three factors. The first involves the dominant elite and their sys-
tem of values when the party system materializes. If the dominant
elite view additional participation as a threat to their existence,
one can expect to find a heavy incidence of resistance to additional
participation. A second related factor depends upon trie hierarchical
system of values of the society. Thus the emphasis upon a representative
15
Ibid., p. 21,
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system depends upon its place in the hierarchical system of values.
The third factor is psychological. Those that have power under a
party system find it difficult to share with new claimants the polit-
ical powers they themselves had to wrestle from the pre-existing
system. x
This discussion leads to the non-competitive party or one-party
system. Some of the factors discussed above encourage one-party sys-
tems, but a more thorough discussion is in order. Perhaps one of the
biggest factors encouraging one-party patterns stems from nationalist
movements and colonial relations, where often a serious crisis of
participation developed. Where nationalist groups were repressed and
forced to become clandestine, the art of responsible leadership and
political compromise lagged. Thus, once independence was achieved,
these groups were likely to show strong identification with the newly
formed state. This led to viewing the opposition as illegitimate,
with different groups becoming uncompromising and monolithic in their
orientation. A?
The first generation of post-colonial, ruling elite in any
developing nation has problems hard to overcome, one of which is the
participatory demands of the younger intellectuals long before the
ruling elite have had a reasonable opportunity to institutionalize
l6Ibid
.. p. *Ktt.
_., ?. 31.
1*
1 fi
party government. To meet this threat s id one-party solution
often becomes the best availabl er.
Different types of one-party rule can be discerned within the
framework of non-competitive systems. a:e-party authoritarian rule
usually is ideologically-oriented but not completely totalitarian in
outlook. These parties typically label the opposition as traitors to
nationalist or revolutionary causes and as threats to security.
A step removed from the one-party authoritarian type is the
totalitarian one-party found in non-competitive systems. Here the
state itself becomes an instrument of a monolithic party. The party
has an ideological goal for reconstructing the system which it tries
to achieve through the total monopoly of power. Where this type of
party develops and is found, it is unlikely that a pluralistic com-
petitive-party system can emerge short of a major upheaval such as
war or revolution.
A third type of party in a non-competitive system, and perhaps
the one which offers the most hope for developing nations, is the
pluralistic one-party type. Others would prefer the term mass party
to this type because, of the three types mentioned, this is the only
one truly capable of gathering a mass basis and following. These
parties tend to be pragmatic in outlook, pluralistic in organization,
and absorptive in relationships to other groups. 20
.., p. 4-02.
l9Ibid.. p. 40
2
°i22£.. PP. 33-39.
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The lack of a strong Ideology and greater support separates
one-party pluralistic typos from the other two types of parties in
non-competitive systems. The lack of a strong commitment to ideology
helps keep this type of party from becoming authoritarian or totali-
tarian. T.-Jith the acceptance of a strong ideology these parties can
quickly degenerate into either of the first two types.
The one-party pluralistic situation suggests a beneficial
approach for dealing with the persistence of traditional values and
the problems traditional elites cause in many newly-emergent develop-
ment nations. As Professor Rupert Emerson suggests, the single, mass
political parties, more than formal governmental or purely social
organizations which often seem to be the prims mediators between the
elites and masses, provide the best hope for building the newest
21
nations. *
Functional Aspects
It should be seen from the definition of political development
given earlier that for the development process to be successful, change
in both structures and functions are necessary. Starting from the
axiom that all political systems have structures, and all structures
are multi-functional, it would be a safe deduction that all parties as
structures have varying kinds of functions which they perform. But here
Lewis ?. Fickett, Jr. , Probl the Developin ons
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company,
, *), p. 127.
16
a warning is necessary. First, all parties do not necossarily strive
to carry on the same functions, i.e., some parties may believe their
rolo is limited to certain functions, while others may take a narrower
or wider view of functional perspectives. Secondly, the typo of party
or parties found within a political system affects functional action,
e.g., a totalitarian party in a system where there is only one party
would be less concerned with the participation function than would a
pluralistic party in the same system. Third, the type of political,
social, and economic system within which parties operate have varying
affects on the functional aspects that parties may participate in and
perform. With the above in mind, attention will now be focused on
functions that political parties may be involved in political
22development.
All political systems have some way of articulating interests
and demands for action, though the means of articulation may vary
greatly. It is through interest articulation's structure and style
that the pattern of boundary maintenance between the polity and society
is established, and within the political system articulation affects
the boundaries between various parts of the political system—parties,
22, ,,The following discussion is based largely on the functional
aspects set forth by Gabriel Almond and James Coleman in Politics of
the Developing; Nations (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 196o7;
the functional framework established by Joseeh La Palombara and Myron
ner in their edited work ?ollti I -ties and Political Develon-
tj as ' functional aeh set forth in Comparative
Politics: A Pavelr-r^ntal Approach by Gabriel Almond ana G." Bingham
Powell.
17
legislatures, bureaucracies, and courts. In a more developed nation
the high degree of associ I interest articulation is a possible
indicator or good boundary maintenance between society and polity,
and Kay contribute to such maintenance within the subsystens of the
political system. 2^
The party system is linked to interest articulation by
standing between interest groups and authoritative governmental agen-
cies. Being in this position, the political party is able to aggre-
gate intarests. Performing the aggregative function effectively
-bles a party to transform diversified interests into a smaller
number of alternative general policies for the cabinet, legislature,
or ruler to act upon. If the process from interest articulation to
aggregation in political parties to legislative consideration is
effective, there is strong assurance that the governmental bureaucracy
will function as a neutral instrument of the political agencies.
Tims, where there is an effective, aggregative party system operating,
the role that the bureaucracy can exert in policy-making is limited.
If the party system is weak in the function of aggregation, this
function and its consequences must pass to another structure such as
the bureaucracy.
In any nation the significance of institutional and anomic
interest groups is related to the absence of an effectively aggregative
23Almond and Coleman, oj3. cit
. , p. 35.
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party system, the uneven effectiveness of associatlcnal >st
groups, and a fragmented political culture. Vihere institutional and
anemic Interest groups are the norm in a nation', "the result is a
legislature penetrated by relatively narrow interests and uncompro-
mising ideological tendencies, a legislature which can be used
. . .
for the protection of special interest, but not for the effective
and timely formulation and support of large policies. And without
a strong legislature, special interest and ideological tendencies
penetrate the bureaucracy, and undermine its neutral, instrumental
character.' 1
From the above, two important points should be noted. First,
the role the bureaucracy plays in political development varies to a
large extent with the effectiveness in which political parties carry
out the aggregation function. Secondly, the question is raised as
to whether there can be an effective party system without working
associational interest groups.
The aggregative function as distinguished from the articulation
function finds few forraal boundaries. But it is the party system
that is the distinctively modern structure of political aggregation.
Thus the aggregation function can be used as one neasure of political
development.
"•'Gabriel A. Almond, Rapporteur, "A Comparative Study of Interest
Groups and the Political Process," L- oliti :o.l Science Hevie-.r
,
.. LII, Ho. 1, March 195*
19
lutti lr.
; : to party systems, it can be said that some party
co interests much more offactively than others. Almond
and Coleman classify party systems under four headings: 1) authori-
tarian, 2) dominant non-authoritarian, 3) competitive party systems,
and i±) competitive multi-party systems. 5 By looking at each of these
systems and the parties which operate within the systems, one gets an
indication of the role these parties have in the aggregation function.
The first type of system, i.e., authoritarian, can itself be
split into tiro different classifications; those where totalitarian
parties are found and those where authoritarian parties are found.
Where totalitarian parties exist, open interest articulation is pos-
sible only at the lowest levels, while interest articulation and
aggregation are latent, or at best covert, above these levels. It is
through the penetration of the social structure and by transmission
of demands and claims solely through the party structure that
totalitarian parties aggregate interests.
Where authoritarian parties are found there is less penetration
of the party into the social structure than under totalitarian parties
and some overt articulation by interest groups is permitted. "The
absence of a free party system and an open electoral process usually
reduces the aggregative function to the formulation of policy
25
.
-"Almond and Coleman, on. cit.
. p. kO. For a contrasting
clas
'
-"'- - 3 see Polltl 1 3: Contemporary
___^ _. ad. Re 5. focridisTpI 227
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alternatives vr... «rty and authoritative
governmental structures. uCO In jenera! s people under an author-
itaria
; m are given no chance to move from the subject to
participant role, partially as a rcsu-o ~ 2 not being able to aggre-
gate interest or demands to affect the input process.
The dominant non-authoritarian party systems have usually
developed
-where nationalist movements achieved independence and
where the nationalist party continues as ti i toinant party. Because
of the status of the party, there is little chance of a coherent
loyal opposition forming. Eras the nationalist party is challenged
by a complex problem of interest aggregation, since the nationalist
movements usually include dissimilar groups. In this type of system
the political elites have the paramount role to play. If the
political elites are not committed to a process of political modern-
ization, the dominant non-authoritarian party aay turn into an
authoritarian party of the type above. But if political moderniza-
tion is the goal, the elites may introduce functionally specific
associational interest groups and perform the political socializa-
tion function in such a tray as to modernize the political culture.
Since the competitive two party system will not be found in
the countries included in this study, it suffices to say that boundary
Imond and Colemar., _-.ro. cit
. ,
p. J+l.
?~oid
., pp. :;/..-....
21
maintenance between society and polity and among the articulative
,
aggregative, and other conversion functions is good. This steins
partly from the fact that the parties are responsible to a broad
electorate and are forced toward aggregative policies. "Where a
major purpose is the election of partisan candidates, the two
parties have a strong incentive toward aggregating at least the most
28
prevalent patterns of demands.
Coiupetitive multi-party systems contain two classifications:
1) the "working" multi-party systems, and, 2) the "iramobilist" multi-
party systems. In the former system the interest aggregation func-
tion and general policy formulation occur at both the party and
29
parliamentary levels in a fairly homogeneous culture. Giovanni .
Sartori would label this party system as "moderate pluralism" in
contrast to "extreme pluralism" which is characteristic of the "im-
mobilist" multi-party systems. Sartori makes the observation that
where moderate pluralism is found, there is a definite likeness to
the pluralism as found in a two party system. Both systems are bi-
polar and centripetal, i.e., they tend to converge inward or toward
the center. The only difference Sartori finds between these two
types of party systems is the complete lack of "polarity" in the
28Almond and Powell, o£. cit
. , pp. 102-103.
'Almond and Coleman, on. cit
. , pp. 42-43.
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simple two party system, while there . s a small amount of "polarity"
found where moderate pluralism is found. 3°
In "immobilist" multi-part items a fragmented, isolative
political culture is usually
. a result, the boundaries be-
tween the articulative and aggregative functions are poor. Any aggre-
gation by parties is relatively narrow, and coalitions tend to fail
because of cultural differences.
^
in brief :<- faen the drive of a
political system is centripetal one finds moderate politics, while
immoderate or extremist politics reflects the prevalence of centrifugal
arives."-^*"
Turning to integration as a function in political development,
two problems emerge. The first can be labeled the "sack-cf-potatoes"
problem, i.e., the necessity of linking previously autonomous units
with each other. This is the problem of changing a fragmented society
into a national society, including ell of the interdependence, spe-
cialisation, and division of labor
-that the latter implies. The
second problem is the "homogenisation" problem, i.e., "the necessity
of creating institutions and a political stylo which can bridge the
gulf between the national elites and all others who at least nominally
•> Sartcri, '"European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized
Pluralism," La Palombara and tfeiner, op_. cit.
, pp. 137-139.
^Almond and Coleman, on. cit
. . p. ^3.
32Sartori, go. cit., p. 139.
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are members of the same polity.""*' In both of those problem:; of
integration, political parties can play an active and important role.
As farther aid in discussing the integration function, the
problems involved, and the role that political parties nay perform
concerning this function, integration will be divided into three
variants: socialization, mobilization, and participation.
Political socialization is the process whereby political
attitudes and values are inculcated as children become adults and as
adults fill roles. Socialization is a continuing process throughout
life and becomes the process by which political cultures are main-
tained and changed. Mobilization is the extreme variant of social-
ization. Here the party attempts to rapidly bring large numbers of
>ple into the political system, to inculcate interest and to secure
mass support. Participation can be placed somewhere behind mobiliza-
tion and in close conjunction with socialization. "It means" states
Roy Macridis, "that through the party in all systems a medium of ex-
pression of interest and participation in deliberation and choice of
policies and leaders is open to all. A degree of prior socialization
and mobilization is a precondition for participation."-^
Political parties 1 effects upon the political socialization
process depends in large measure upon the type of system. In competitive
3Q
-Richard R. Fagen, Polities arid Communication (Boston:
Brown and Company, .
. >.
"*"
-
- -Imond and Powell, oj>. cit.
, pp. 6V66.
^^Macridis, op_. cit
. . p. 18.
Little,
and multi-party systoms, the socialization process can bo viewed as
reaching its apex with participation in the adaptive political party
and consequently participation in the political system itself. Thus
the party is not the main socializer (found rather in the family,
school, and work), but the party is the basic link between the people
and governmental elites. Thus an advantage of this type of system
in the socialization process is that those who are able to participate
in decisions (or at least boiieve they do) will thereby be more satis-
fied with the decisions. Consequently, people become greater attached
to these systems than are people who cannot participate in their
>°
systems.
Also within the competitive and multi-party systems (where
moderate pluralism exists), the "sack-of-potatoes" problem spoken of
above is likely to already have been largely overcome—though at times
multi-party systems (extreme pluralism) perpetuate this problem. "In
highly developed systems where there exist widely read newspapers,
effective education systems, and well established adult political
attitudes, parties play a relatively minor role in inculcating feel-
ings of being a national or being a citizen."-" Thus, political
parties are able to concentrate on the problem of "homogenization,
"
* Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, Civic Culture (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1965), p. 1$
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i.e., the parties can work to close the gap between government elites
and others of tho polity through the aggregative function.
But even where the "saek-of-potatoes" problem has not been
overcome, there is some evidence to suggest that adaptive parties,
electorally oriented, can play an Important role in affecting behav-
ioral and attitudinal changes. As Kyron Weiner and Joseph la Palombara
point out, "In its efforts to win electoral support from conflicting
ethnic and class groups the adaptive party may have greater success
in achieving national integration than a party which relies more
heavily on coercion and exhortation."^ Thus it appears possible
that mobilist parties may not be the only road to integration.
A very different picture appears where the system is authoritarian.
Here the socialisation process is quite different where mobilist and/or
totalitarian parties exist. In this situation the party seeks to
penetrate all levels of the social structure and inculcate its own
norms within society. In order to do this, the schools and vocational
habitations become prime instruments for the political party.
Where a fragmented culture exists, the means available to the
party place it in the strong position to break down fragmentation and
strengthen national integration. But in the process, one-party au-
thoritarian systems often facilitate the emergence of oligarchical
systems concerned with political survival and national aggrandizement
bid. , p. 426.
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rather than social welfare or democratic political values. Thus
concern in overcoming the "homogenization" problem may be lacking.
Perhaps long-ran socialization in authoritarian systems depends upon
the effectiveness of the single party in developing a sense of popular
support even while effective political participation is absent.^
Parties within the dominant non-authoritarian system take the
form of pluralist or authoritarian parties. Where authoritarian
parties are found, the socializing toward integration and development
is apt to be weak, since these parties lack the "planned control
characteristics of totalitarian parties and the advantages of inno-
vation and experimentation made possible by pluralistic systems. The
result of authoritarian party rule in the long run means stagnation
and socialization toward a status quo position rather than develop-
ment. If there should be a drive started toward development the
authoritarian party will almost have to move in the competitive-
pluralist or totalitarian direction. u In other words, development
as embodied in the functions of integration and socialization is not
a strong point of authoritarian parties.
Where the pluralist party is found, there is concern for the
political socialization and development of the society. But the con-
cern is not so strong as to be ruthless. The pluralist party, with
39Ibid., p. 426.
id.
, p. 38,
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its pragmatic outlook and absorptive character, is far loss concerned
over the persistonco of traditional elites and structures within the
society than the totalitarian party. The socialization process fol-
lowed by the pluralist party is undoubtedly slow but has the advantage
of possibly giving years of needed stability to the system. Further-
more, the pluralist party can be an effective means of attacking the
"homogenization" problem and "sack-of-potatoes" problem at the same
time—two problems which most developing nations face.
As stated earlier, the mobilization function is used to
inculcate interest and secure mass support, when used by a party,
mobilization is concerned with people accepting party ideology and
expounding it, as well as securing mass support for the party, system,
or both. Where multi-party or competitive systems are found, chances
are that ideology is rather unimportant. Also, support for the sys-
tem is likely to be taught in the family and school. Consequently,
adaptive and competitive parties become most concerned with securing
party support for elections. In other words, these parties, operating
in a democratic system, have no real cause to be involved with the
mobilization function except for support.
Sometimes within the multi-party system can be found parties
acting within the legitimate system, but still advocating a system
change, e.g., the Communist Party in Israel. It may be necessary
where a mobilist party is operating in a multi-party system to use the
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legal system to exclude those w3 ^roy it.^1 For
developing countries where the system is attempting to gain mass sup-
port, this point may become . :sity if ." tern is to continue.
This action may also become a necessity In the dominant non-author-
itarian system.
In an authoritarian system where totalitarian and authoritarian
parties are found, the mobilization function is frequently resorted
to. Often an external threat (real or not) is used by the party to
gain support from the masses. Where mobilization is the emphasis for
greater integration, the party is more repressive. "The party, through
the government or directly, imposes sanctions upon members and non-
members alike, controls the fate of all other associations and parties,
and endeavors to exact obedience and to fashion the minds and loyalties
of the adherents in a manner that not only does not allow for opposi-
tion but penalizes opposition and the dissent."^2 Thus it appears
that parties attempting to mobilize and integrate will have repres-
sive phases connected with them.
Turning to the dominant non-authoritarian system where pluralist
parties are found, the mobilist function plays a lesser role than is
found in "the authoritarian systems. Instead of being repressive, they
are rather persuasive. Thus what mobilization takes place is geared
-,-:.
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to development and the presentation of policy in order to gala as
widespread support as possible. But a pluralist party is often hard
pressed when support of the system is urgently needed and new interests
are required for development. Although the pluralist political party
nay appear to have a great potential for mobilization and integration,
it is a difficult task to translate the potential into reality.
Roy >:acridis, speaking of mobilization and integration, gives
a statement that should be testable in our later analysis when he
states, t:
. .
.one might state that the greater the emphasis upon
mobilization, the less open and democratic the system; the greater
the emphasis upon integration, the more repressive the party and the
greater the likelihood of a one-party system." ^
A characteristic feature of political development is an
increased demand for political participation. This demand is generally
linked with increased urbanization, the growth of mass communications,
and the spread of literacy. The political party becomes a major
determinant in how the participation function is to be exercised as
well as a means of its pursuit. In developing nations where there is
increasing desire for participation, party government response moves
between repression and accommodation of participation. Some party
systems believe repression employed early will reduce the need for
such later. Other systems only turn repressive with the growth of
k: ibid
. . p. 18.
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violence or threat of new groups. Four over-all patterns of response
to participation by party systems can bo discerned: 1) repression,
2) mobilisation, 3) limited admission, and, k) full admission.
Repression is found dominantly in authoritarian party systems,
i.e., whore totalitarian and authoritarian parties are found. Where
the ruling party elites adhere to a strong ideology, whether social,
religious, or economic, and if increased participation in the political
system is viewed as a threat to the elites and their value system,
heavy resistance to additional participation will likely be found.
Another factor in repression stems from the notion that new
elites operating under a party system find it difficult to share with
others the political powers they themselves had to struggle for. This
factor ".
.
.must now include the reactions to participatory demands
by Western-educated elites in Asia and Africa who are manifestly not
prepared to act on the very premises that presumably governed their
own thrusts against colonial or other indigenous political powers. 11
In developing nations operating under party systems, strong
participatory demands confront the elites before institutionalized
party government can settle itself. Where the system is not already
authoritarian, the new drives for participation may lead in this
direction. Thus the probability of repression is much higher where
the demands for participation are not spread over a length of time.
k5
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Not all ono-party systems handle participatory demands through
repression. Often under dominant non-authoritarian systems and where
mobilist and/or pluralist parties are found, tcipation is en-
couraged—but under carefully controlled and prescribed limits. In
other words, the guise -of participation is wanted without giving up
control of power. This often is attempted by developing a subjective
sense of participation while at the same time preventing the populace
from affecting public policy, administration, or the selection of
those who will in fact govern. No doubt the movement from a dominant
non-authoritarian system to a competitive party system will hinge con-
siderably upon trying to move beyond the subjective sense of
participation.
In some nations parties are allowed to organize after a period
of repression by the government. Where limited admission is pro-
longed, the consequence is usually alienated parties. "Forged during
an era of political repression, the alienated class, ethnic-or regional-
based party develops its own myths and legends. It thus alienates
its members from the society at large and may institutionalize such
47
alienation." With alienation, the chances of integration and
participation are decreased, as is stability.
In contrast to limited admission into the system is found full
admission into the system. This action is possible in competitive,
4<
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multi-party, and dominant non-ai rty systems. In the
former two systems, participation about through existing
parties or by the formation of now pa 38. In the latter system,
participation in the dominant party may be increased though partici-
pation can only go so far in this form, or, participation may be en-
hanced by the formation of a new party or parties in the system.
However participation is increased, it is conditioned by whether the
governing party is an ideological or an electoral instrument since
new participation demands are mere easily handled by electorally
oriented rather than ideologically oriented political parties.
In closing our discussion on participation, perhaps a statement
by Eyron Weiner and Joseph La Palombara concerning the causes for a
fragmented party system is appropriate. They state, llIf the impetus
to participate comes from a social class, such as the industrial
workers or agricultural peasants, and it is opposed or repressed, we
can expect class-based parties to emerge; if the demand of participa-
tion is geographically based, or reflects a desire for previously
denied participation on the part of a religious or ethnic minority,
the failure to gradually absorb leaders of such groups into the pre-
vailing system will almost certainly give rise to political parties
that reflect these narrow impulses to organization. 11 ^
48
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With the above framework of parties and functions, Syria and
Tunisia will be studied in a t to rciato the parties in L.
) newly-independent nations bo the functions of aggregation and
integration found in the political development process.
Syria
Party development in Syria has all too often followed lin&s
that enforced the already existing fragmentation of the Syrian
political culture. Only the Ba'th has been able largely to overcome
this basic deficiency in Syrian politics. From independence until
1953, parties, somewhat excluding the Ba'th, tended to extremes of
adaptiveness or mobilism, with none having particularly successful
luck. The trend toward enforcing cultural differences made most
Syrian parties work for political integration only on their own terms.
The first recognized political parties in Syria after
independence, i.e., the National and People's parties, both followed
the adaptive position in their approach to politics. Ivhen independence
was achieved, the National Bloc lost its unifying factor with cultural
differences playing a large role in the break-up of the party. Both
National and People's parties emerged from the 31oc and became geo-
graphically differentiated. Neither of these parties had an active
program, though the People's Party made a greater attempt at such a
move. Thus neither party seemed interested in attempting to integrate
the existing political culture. Instead, they tried to profit from
the fragmentation.
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the close shment to
the xoadors, 11 t .e parti about in these
two parties; rather they worked for maintaining the old order. Both
were pragmatic in their approach, follow: te course they thought
suited then best. Perhaps this can be seen plainly in the 1$&7 elec-
tion when the National Party thought it beneficial to keep the old
electoral law, while the People's Party siced with the Sa'th in want-
ing to extend the franchise. It can be seen again in the musical
chairs game they played with Arab nationalism. With opportunism of
this sort forming the basis for action, little integration, social-
ization, and participation could be expected to develop for the entire
system.
- -
ips both the National and People's parties' attitudes
toward fostering a feeling of legitimacy in the public was affected
by the non-competitive environment from which they stemmed. When
either party was in power, there was little use for the opposition.
The failure of Syria and the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli war worked to
make more of the public to seek the right to influence the political
system. By the time the National and People's parties learned they
would have to instill a feeling of legitimacy for their rule, several
military coups became the source of legitimacy. 50 Thus both these
Patrick Seale brings these points out in varying sections of?**ork, The Si xford University Press
19coJ. See e j 28-31, up. 77-79.
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parties failed to instill the fee! legitimacy required for the
parliamentary system to ope tively.
With little feeling of legitimacy working for either,
especially after Shishakli's coup, the National and People's parties
showed they could not cope with the conflicts that they encountered.
They failed to even attempt a half-hearted try at integration, while
holding political participation to a minimum. Thus much blame must
go to "these two parties for the instability of the Syrian political
system. The short-sightedness of their leaders, the failure to
achieve effective compromises, their lack of regard for the masses,
and the failure to establish a plan and base for action all helped
to make these two parties a failure in the picture of Syrian polit-
ical development. D They failed in establishing new patterns of
integration regulating and containing the tensions and conflicts pro-
duced by cultural differentiation, in addition to refusing to
recognize any equality or participation on the part of the masses.
The Muslim Brotherhood finds its place in the Syrian political
scene as a result of the support it receives from fervent Muslims.
Against a secular state, the 3rotherhood has become more militant in
its actions over the years. Although hardly ever an official party,
it set up the Islamic Socialist Front in 19^9 to espouse its views.
il concer point see Gordon H.
Torrey, . Ohio state
University Press,
... 2-3,
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With tho switch of Akram al-Havrani from the Front to the Ba'th in
the early 1950* s, the Front lost influence. But by acting on the
religious sentiments of the conservative Islamic elements in the
Syrian society, the Brotherhood remained aloof from the more progres-
sive elements of society, further strengthening fragmentation.
The Brotherhood appears to be interested in integrating
society but on an Islamic order. To the more secular, this idea is
unfavorable. Brotherhood suppression throughout the years and the
clandestine characteristics it has had to adopt, pluc its conserva-
tive character, makes suspect the role it might play in political
development.
Also the Brotherhood is an externally created party -which
makes one question whether it can ever enter the political process
with any real identification to the legislative institutions of this
process. With its present repression the answer can only take on a
negative aspect.
After Shishakli* s takeover and the banning of all parties,
Shishakli established the Arab Liberation Movement. This was hoped
to become a mass party to strengthen the rule of Shishakli. Its
ideology was a hybrid of Arab nationalism and progressive social
economic reforms. But its monolithic structure gave no chance for
52~Seale, op. pit
. . p. 180. For more information on the
Islamic Socic.: Front see Chapters \ .. D, 11.
ass-roots in volu :sscci „ was enthusiasm for
the party at first. Diss : in 195 t reformed in 1956, it never
became an adequate substitute for trties to which the
Syrian electorate had grown accustomed."
With the -onion of Syria Igy the Syrian Arab Socialist
Union (ASU) was formed in Syria. It has repeatedly called for a
rapprochement between Syria and Egypt, becoming a bitter foe of the
ruling Ba'th. Because of Nasir : s popularity it has gained a follow-
ing in Syria although its size is unknown. What effects it has had
on political development is small, as it has been underground through-
out its existence except for the time of union. If anything, it has
been an unstabilizing factor as it has repeatedly called for a
Ba'thist overthrow. Reporting on a statement by the ASU against the
Ba'th, the April 18, 1966 issue of the Arab World stated, 1! 'Ihe Syrian
Arab Socialist Union issued a statement yesterday again calling for
elimination of the Ba'thist regime as a means for fulfillment of
unity between Syria and UAR ... It said that the Syrians should
not rally around the new Ba'thist leaders, but rather should rally
against them." With such expressions as these, the Syrian Arab
Socialist Union provides little help for political development at the
present time.
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now turn to the Syrian Nationalist
i (SSNP), the Syrian
Ba'th Party, and the Syr:..-- Cm
. All three of these
parties have had or have an ideology and plan of action hoping to
effect behavioral and attitudinal change within society.
The following discussion on the SSNP points out an extremely
important aspect for parties and political development in develop-
ing nations. This revolves around the idea that no party can expect
to be a mass supported party if it is not willing to play down some
aspects of its mobilist role for adaptive measures.
The SSHP had an ideology of mass action, but one which found
itself too far from the mainstream of thought of the Syrian people
to take effective hold. The party derived its inspiration from the
genius of the Syrian Nation and its cultural-political-national history
at a time when the broader Arab nationalist outlook was becoming
popular in Syria. Thus instead of adopting an idea that was be-
coming popular, the SSNP accepted the Syrian national ideology of
Anton Sa'ada. The party kept this ideology, with its seemingly anti-
Islamic anti-Arab guise, making any attempt at integration of the
political culture impossible for them. The strictness of its ideology,
a concept often associated with externally created parties, made any
attempt at compromise or toleration formidable for the SSNP.
The internal makeup of the SSil? created a situation which
discouraged both participation and socialisation into the political
system. The party was vertically structured ith authority concentrated
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in tho party leader and his appointed lieutenants. Thus a loader
like Sa'ada was both lawgiver and legislator for the party. The
only participation for the common member was that given by the party
loader which usually meant showing support when it was called for.
Socialisation was limited to what the party deemed relevant for the
members. Tho party's total rejection of the traditional cultural
values and its commitment to Western norms of bureaucratic organization
helped spell its doom.
Other political parties linked SSNP nationalism with Western
arts to weaken the Arab nationalist movement. This, along with
the party's social philosophy, placed the finishing touches on isola-
ting the SSNP from the masses. Thus immediately after independence,
the SSNP hindered integration at a time when political integration
was so important for Syria's future.
The above is well summarized by Labib Yamak when he states,
"The defeat of the SSNP can be interpreted as having resulted directly
from its failure to build grass-roots support for its doctrine and
general policies. By the end of 195^ it was quite alienated from
the people and from the mainstream of political thinking in Syria
57
which by then had decidedly turned to the left."
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The Syrian Corr."unist Party is the oldest ideological party in
Syria. Throughout its history it has tried to effect behavioral change
in Syrian society. But unlike the SSKP, the Syrian Communist Party
has used adaptive measures to try and increase its popular support.
With the early failure of gaining proletarian support, the
party under Bakdash turned to the bourgeoisie for support. This move
has several implications for political development. By turning to
the bourgeoisie the party shied away from the lower working classes
it supposedly stood for. Thus many of those needing the participa-
tion and integration for political development were excluded. Possibly
the Communists cannot take the brunt of the blame for this action,
as Syrian workers were little attracted to the Communist Party on
account of several factors. Where there was only a small urban pro-
letarian class, where agrarian unrest was small because of strong
traditions and family loyalties, and where religion remained a social
force there was little appeal to communism.
^
8 That the communists
failed to integrate these sections of the society shows perhaps the
biggest hurdle the party has been unable to overcome.
The Syrian Communist Party's appeal for Syrians is not based
on classical Marxist doctrine. Rather it has shewn its adaptive side
by using the accumulated resontment of the West to bo its first line
- ichael W. Suleiman, "The Lebanese' Communist Party " Kiddie
Eastern Studies
. Ill (January, I967), p. 146.
of solicitation. In Syria this aspect takss on added meaning because
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of Israel's close connections with the West. ' Here perhaps more than
any other approach the Communists had an appeal that could engender
mass support. 3ut this suit was largely undermined by the Ba'th and
other Communist actions.
The Soviet role in favor of a Jewish state in Falestine caused
the near extinction of the Syrian Communist Party. Few people, except
those highly ideologically oriented, were willing to follow and sup-
port their ideas. The suppression of the party in this period made
it turn to militant tactics. Any idea of fostering legitimacy was
lost, adding further instability to the already unstable system.
Because of its tight organization, the party had a capacity to disrupt
internal affairs far beyond its numbers.
Thus till 1953 the Communist Party played a small role in
building political participation and integration. Its members were
socialized, but in ways detrimental to political development. Its
marching and rioting in the streets surely must be viewed as a dis-
ruptive force. Party repression led to a militant view toward con-
flict management. But the Communist Party of Syria has an immensely
strong point that many other Syrian parties failed to have, the art
of compromise and collaboration. The Syrian Communists became very
-^ALmond and Coleman, 00. pit
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pt at this art to improve their own position. In the 1954 parlia-
mentary elections, Khalid Bakdash even collaborated with Syria's'fted
millionaire
'
Khalid al-Azem. Eut communist friendship always
seemed short-lived.
With the -union of Syria and Egypt in 1958, the Communists were
caught in the dilemma of being forced to attend their own funeral.
If they rejected the idea of union they would be alienating them-
selves from the strongest political force Syria had known. But Nasir's
anti-CoiiBttunist policy could not be called appealing for them. Finally
party was placed over union, showing that the party was more important
than the strongest integrating factor in Syrian society.
With union the Syrian Communists were repressed and went
underground. This action pushed the Communists deeper into the role
that we have ascribed to parties that are government repressed. The
breakup of the UAR saw the Communists violently attack the ruling
Ba'th Party in Syria, showing little respect. In the December 1, 1963
issue of Al-Akhbar
.
the Syrian Communist Party stated, "Citizens—all
nationalists—no matter what their convictions—and even members of
the Ba'th Party know from experience that the decisions taken by the
3a , thists at their conferences, and their slogans of Freedom, Unity,
and Socialism are meaningless. The decisions and slogans are exploited
61Ibid., p. 370.
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in an attempt to deceive the people and to mask the Party's policy
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of allegiance to imperialism and antagonism to the people," Attacks
such as this can hardly be a help in establishing political legitimacy
or integration.
What the future role of the Syrian Communist Party will be in
developing the Syrian political system is uncertain. As long as the
Ba'th remains preeminent in Syria the Communists' chances for rule
are extremely low.* The lack of Communist appeal to the Syrian
people expressed above would warrant a pessimistic view of the Syrian
Communists in future political development, even though the Communists
have been showing greater support for the Ba'th since the 1966 split
within the Ea'th Party and presently have a few members among Syria's
ruling hierarchy.
The Syrian Ea'th party is an externally created party, as are
almost all parties in Syria. But the Ba'th alone has had the leader-
ship of ideology needed to adapt itself to the Syrian masses. It
has been the chief motivating factor behind Arab nationalism and has
continually been anti-Western in its outlook. The Ea'th trinity of
Unity, Liberty, and Socialism has had great appeal to the Syrian
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The possibility does exist of Communist infiltration into the
inner ranks of the Ea'th. If this should happen, Communist chances
for gaining power would undoubtedly increase.
students and intellectuals. But the Ba'th road to power has not
been an easy one.
The Ba'th's secular outlook did little at first in helping
integrate the more religious elements, allowing them nowhere to turn
but to the radical conservative Muslim Brotherhood. In 1954 the
'ulama or religious leaders of Damascus even issued a proclamation
supporting the demonstrations of their colleagues in Aleppo against
the atheistic tendencies of the 3a' th.°3 But with greater secular-
ization of Syrian society and mass appeal the Ba'th has largely over-
come the religious problem.
The Ba'th, even more so than the Communists, learned the value
of compromise for its own enhancement. With a less radical attitude
than the Communists, the Ba'th found itself in a position of greater
adaptability to other parties. Throughout Ba'th history can be found
alliances and cooperation, but always cooperation that suited Ba'th
interests. After Kalki's murder, the Ba'th found it to their advan-
tage to side with the Communists in the destruction of the SSKP whose
ideology ran counter to the Ba'th's. Many such related instances
could be cited, but Eamal S. Abu Jaber summed up the situation when
he wrote, "Relations of the Ea'th with other political parties in the
Arab world are colored by the party's interests.. When such cooperation
6: ..
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was profitable, the Ea'th did net hesitate to indulge in it whether
ie party was »progre! or 'reactionary.' The degree of coopera-
fii.
tion was determined by Ba*th in .3." If nothing else this
showed some refinement an b of Ea'th leaders, at lea^t until
they achieved power.
The strong a] -I of the 2a » thist ideology to the masses,
especially that of Arab nationalism, has perhaps contributed to the
integration of Syrian society more than any other factor except the
Israel dilemma. Vlhere the Ccenmonists worked predominantly with the
middle class, the Ba'th achieved agrarian support. But it also ac-
quired the greatest student and intellectual support in Syria. Thus
by attempting a grass roots base, the party has helped bring the
political system to the masses. This action by the Ba'th has been a
major factor in integration and participation. But this is somewhat
blurred by the Ba'th action of party repression once it achieved power.
During the first fifteen years of independence the Ba'th
continually xvorked for greater voting participation. With the People's
Party it appealed for universal suffrage—and won. After this, it
appealed for completely secret ballots in opposition to the National
and People's parties. While Ba'thist motives behind these moves may
have been purely in their own interest, few things can help foster a
feeling of participation and legitimacy as taking an actual role in
elections.
Kama! S. Abu Jaber,
ldeolopy
,
and G tion (S r,
p. I5T.
1 Socialist P. rtv ; History
,
. _se University Press
46
The Ba'th in the middle 1950 's gained a backing in the Syrian
army next to none. This infiltration of the amy had serious effects
on Syrian political development in the late 1950's and 19o0's. With
army backing, the party had the chance to remain in power, with Com-
munist support, in the immediate years before union. Also, with army
backing the Ba'th could breathe easier when conflict arose. With the
breakup of the UAR in 1961, the army-backed Ba'th became critical of
all other parties though it purported to allow other parties.
On Kay 29, I963, Salah al-Din Bitar made this statement.
"I personally do not advocate the rule of one party
despite rumors to this effect about the Ba'th Party ... It
is possible for other parties to be established, but their
establishment must be natural and not artificial. The first
condition is that the establishment of parties must be natural
and represent Arab revolutionary trends as they are at present.
The second absolutely essential condition, and this I say
with all frankness, is that as long as we are in the phase
of building the revolution of Liberty, Unity, and Socialism,
and as long as we are deciding that the parties that are
established naturally are the parties that represent these
objectives, then it is necessary that these parties should
combine in a Front, that they should co-operate, restrict
their differences to natters of opinion, indeed sink their
differences altogether and come to an arrangement the char-
acteristic of which is cooperation, not envy, hatred and
contentiousness. In my opinion, if we are able to secure
these two conditions, it is possible, indeed it is essential,
that we should not have a one-party state. It is also, of
course, essential that this Front should be properly led./-<-
But this does not mean autocracy or a monopoly of power."
Thus any participation of other parties and their legitimacy to exist
rested with the Ba'th. If this remains the policy since the Ba'th
65»Official Kews Bulletin—Syria-4Sttf 29, 1963," Arab Political
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split of early 1966, regains unclear. But possibly with the split
and the 'Keo-Ea'thists' trying to consolidate power, this position
may become more extreme. If so, participation and legitimacy in
political development outside the Ea'th may be curtailed.
Though the Ba'th has been taken over by the left-wing of the
party, there have been statements that the new leadership would ad-
here to most former principles of the party. But former Ba'th Farty
leaders are now leading underground resistance against the new junta.
Since the Ba'th is the ruling party, this situation could undermine
future political development. The ruling section may have to resort
to methods giving little help in political development if they want
to stay in power. The ousted section in return may undermine the
political integration and legitimacy the Ba'th Party has built. But
the left-wing appears to be making a strong effort to gain the sup-
port of the masses and to instill a legitimate attitude in the public
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sector towards it. Only time can tell their success.
Tunisia
When the French, after a brief military campaign, established
Tunisia as a protectorate in 1831, Tunisia had a population of about
1.3 million—half of whom lived in settled communities. Though Tunisia
66Arab World
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followed a cautious status quo path under the French during the first
years of the protectorate, there was already nuch in Tunisian society
that was sound and could serve as a foundation for development. The
size, geography, and historical -tradition of Tunisia gave rise to a
rather homogeneous population with a long tradition of living together
and considering itself a single society. It was the most cohesive of
Islamic societies in the late l800 s s, except possibly Egypt.
Within Tunisia could be found one national language, Arabic,
except for a few thousand Berber-speaking inhabitants of the mountain
regions. Also a strong religious uniformity existed. Except for an
integrated Jewish minority, the Haliki rite of orthodox Islam, i.e.,
Sunni, was followed by all Tunisian Moslems. Added to these factors
was the unbroken "tradition of settled life along Tunisia's coast line.
A village every three or four miles could be found in the thriving
Sahel (Arabic for coast) area. "With a certain shared tradition and
an orderly life based on a relatively high level of urbanization, the
Sahel, the real Tunisia, was much further along the road to moderniza-
tion than the European might have realized. Great change could be
made with the addition of only two major ingredients
—
greater public
security and the concept of the positive state."
^Leon Carl Brown, "Stages in the Process of Change," Tunisia ;jhe politics of Modern:' i, ed. Charles A. Mcaud (New York:
-- .derick A. Praeger, :.
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The French Protectorate lasting for seventy-five years gave
Tunisia at the time of independence the basis of a modern economy,
which played an immeasurable role in conditioning the Tunisian men-
tality to modernist views. The French established a larger measure
of public security by bringing the Bedouins under greater control.
Also, the French were responsible for an orderly collection of taxes
as had not existed before.
During the 1890's the French pushed for the colonization of
more French citizens in the Protectorate. The aggressive capitalist
spirit brought by the French colon, coupled with the feeling of
stewardship toward the local population by the higher protectorate
officials, as well as the eclectic acceptance of the native Tunisians
—
all helped push Tunisia into the modern world without destroying the
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foundations of Tunisian society.
Even though Tunisia had the highest concentration of European
settlers in the Afro-Asia world, except for South Africa and Algeria,
Tunisia never became an integral part of France as its neighbor
Algeria did. While the effects of the French settlers were great,
the French colon never became large or strong enough to threaten
70
assimilation of the indigenous society.
69Ibid.
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*'or figures concerning this relationship see, Clement Henry
Moore, Tunisia Since Independence; The Dynamics of One-Party Govern-
ment (Berkeley: University of California press, 1965), p. 16.
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But tho settler society in Tunisia Louble consequences
"that mere foreign rule probably would not have brought about:
urbanisation, new patterns of land tenure, secular jurisdiction, the
creation of a modern economy, the development of a settler politics,
and new educational opportunities. Together these factors served
not only to stimulate tho spread of ideas and ways of living but also
to create within the native society sets of alienated individuals and
71
classes." Alongside the modorn existed sectors unassimilated to the
new order. The old native elite became unsure of itself, while many
of the native landowners failed in modernizing. Students were with-
out jobs, and many bedouins were landless.
What emerged after fifty years of French rule were new classes—
but classes that did not belong to either the old native class or the
new modernised sector. Included in this number were students, indus-
trial proletariat, a clerical class, agricultural workers of colon
farms, and perhaps most important, "the educated counter-elite. Even
though the French government made efforts at reform, the strength of
the Tunisian settlers undermined all efforts, and thus brought about
the political tensions required for -the unfolding of what Clement
Moore has termed the "colonial dialectic." As Moore views it, "If the
dialectic fully unfolds, a modernist elite absorbs most of the alienated
sectors under its nationalist banner, while overpowering recalcitrant
71Ibid
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traditional sector; by virtue of its 1 i ficult political
conflict with the colonial powers, it absorbs modern political style
and values .... Through the working the colonial dialectic,
a modern political system was able to c e p in Tunisia before
72independence.
"
The dialectic in Tunisia consummated in the Keo-Bestour Party
which led Tunisia to independence in 1956. But before dealing with
the Neo-Destour, two earlier groupings must be viewed to place the
..^o-Destour in the proper perspective—the "Young Tunisians'' 1 and the
Destour (Constitution) Party.
At the turn of the century the Young Tunisians began to play
a role in Tunisian society. Since no direct national leadership was
allowed by the French, the Young Tunisians began to play a middle
role between the French and the Tunisian people, i.e., they became a
two-way channel. The success that the Young Tunisians had until 1912
is in a large sense due to the fact that the traditional, hierarchical
society was still largely intact.
Most of the Young Tunisians were university educated and
believed in the rights of man and a universal society transcending
race and religion. By supporting a "liberal" France, the Young
Tunisians hoped to aid the evolution of Tunisian society and more
than offset the arrogance and presumptuous claims of the French settlers
in Tunisia. Though the Young Tunisians were not against the Islamic
aid,
.pp. 25-25.
religion as such, their program was secular and made a clear-cut
distinction between the religious .itution and the state. Thus
the early secular train of thought in Tunisia.
Four major tl were incorporated into Young Tunisian
ideology; 1) the formation of a new brand of Tunisian patriotism
within the colonial framework, 2) the concept of the positive state,
3) the role of education, and 4) the deve^ t of a critical faculty
accompanied by an absence of apologetics. The Young Tunisians
placed their emphasis upon cultural, economic, and educational matters.
one real political leaning shown was the acceptance of the French
Protectorate as a positive modernizing influence.
Up until the Young Tunisians, government in 'Tunisia was viewed
as something to be avoided. But with most of the Young Tunisians
having studied in France, they became convinced that a modern state
could carry out a social revolution. Embodied within a modem state
were two concepts the Young Tunisians were deeply concerned with:
what the state should be and what the state should do. The Young
Tunisians had seen what a government of men means and thus wanted a
government by law. They preferred legal codes as found in the /Jest,
as well as a modern administrative system. Realizing that the general
Tunisian population would be reluctant to accept their program in
totality led to little emphasis on democracy or the contrary.
- rown, ojo. cit.
,
p. 26.
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Their purpose was a government for the people that would eventually
make possible government of and by the people. For this reason they
believed government should be strong.
Government should be able to intervene in all areas except
the press, thought the Young Tunisians. If the Protectorate Govern-
ment would help with indigenous colonization, the Young Tunisians saw
no reason for action against the Protectorate—an indication of the
75
intensity of the Young Tunisians 1 belief in positive government.
In the realm of education, the Young Tunisians were a vehement
voice demanding more and better education. This education was to be
modern and patterned after the French system. Eventually both Koranic
schools and Franco-Arab schools were accepted. But the importance of
the latter is seen in that the real leadership, from the time of the
Young Tunisians until the present, has come from the French and Franco-
Arab schools.
The good feeling between the Protectorate Government and the
Young Tunisians slowly ebbed away. Finally after several incidents in
1911-12, the Young Tunisians' fate was doomed with the declaring of
martial law—lasting until 1921. But Young Tunisian ideas that had been
rationally and frankly advanced were to survive the setback, though the
Young Tunisians failed to reappear.
74Ibid,
. pp. 27-29.
75Ibid.
, p. 30.
5H
After World War Iai rouj of Tunisians entered politics.
At tile same tine, a sense of grievance against the colonial regime
was growing, helped partially by the exposure of many Tunisians to
Wilson's idea of self-det ation* These new politicians were
mostly members of the old elite who had found no satisfying place in
the system advocated by the Young Tunisians. In 1920 the Costour
Party was established essentially as the party of those older elites.
It became basically Islamic, traditionalist, socially reactionary,
and inflexible. The party was able to mobilize the masses for
demonstrations, but the did not have a mass membership (nor did
it want it), or an articulated modern structure.
- Destour followed the Young Tunisian movement in only one
major way. By talcing the position of accepting, at least implicitly,
the existence of the French Protectorate, they took the position as
advocate and interlocutor between the French officials and the Tunisian
masses as had the Young Tunisians. In contrast to -£iq Young Tunisians,
the Destour rejected many of the innovations introduced by the French
rule in "the name of nationalism and anticolonialism. The Destour, by
becoming the first coherent and broadly based movement against the
French Protectorate, gave a strong contribution to Tunisian nationalism.
"The Young Tunisians' ideas had been too modernist and moderate to
76Moore, o£. cat., p. 27. For a different interpretation see,
Brown, o£. cit., p. :>. .
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reach beyond a narrow cultivated elite into the society as a whole.
With the Destour the modernist idea of assimilation was unequivocally
rejected, and the first groping gestures were made in search of a
national identity." 77
The Destour reached its peak In Tunisia within two years after
its conception, but from this point its strength and backing dissipated.
Though many sympathized with the Destour from 1920-22, few were brought
into the party to help in penetrating the Tunisian society. With the
departure of its charismatic leader, Taalbi, on an extended tour of
the Middle East, the Destour' s fortunes steadily decreased, with the
party becoming locked in the traditional segments of society it
represented.
The lack of support by the Destour for other segments of the
society is seen in their actions in regards to a strike by members of
the CGTT (Confederation Ge'nerale des Travailleurs Tunisians). Break-
ing away in 1924 from the Socialist CGT (Confederation Ge'nerale des
Travailleurs) were thousands of Muslim workers who joined to form the
CGTT. By 1925 the CGTT had gained widespread support and launched a
number of strikes and demonstrations. After six months of this action
the Protectorate authorities dissolved the CGTT, while the Destour did
little in attempting to back the CGTT. "To the workers the Destour 's
fault lay not in its traditionalism
. .
. but in its modern bourgeois
77lbid
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betrayal of the pooplc. Actually, the Dortour disdained the workers
more for their bedouin origins than bee rZ any 1st class bias.
Modern methods of political agitation, too, were hardly in accord with
the Destour's legalistic approach to politics."
A new political st .js introduced as opposition to the
Dcstour with the forming of the Neo-Destour under Habib Bourguiba in
193^. For more than two cccades the Neo-Destour was in opposition to
foreign rule. The cohesion of the people in the Neo-Destour was
greatly helped by the continued struggle against foreign domination
seen in intermittent party suppression and the jailing of its leaders.
From 193^-54- Bourguiba himself was imprisoned for a total time of ten
years (193^-36, 1933-^3, 1 952-5k). But the party used these years to
build a positive program and new political style in the face of ob-
struction by the older Destour.
urguiba also used these years to develop the skills of a
hero-statesman. He became an orator able to move his people, and the
organizer of an effective mass political organization. During the
two decades before independence, Bourguiba came to personify the new
.jr.. His leadership became unchallenged and provided for the
continuity of political ideals and tactics that effectively shaped
Tunisia's modernist ambitions. Bourguiba advocated no rigid doctrine
78- bid
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but did believe in democracy and the moral value of the individual.
His policy and that of the Neo-Destour lacked commitment to any pro-
79gram except independence and modernization.
Four years after its establ: - . the Neo-Destour had a mass
following far overshadow!.. &e Destour. . .jarr.in Rivlin
has stated, "Soon after the .
.
ance of the Neo-Destour, it became
the leading nationalist party. Its activities, sparked by the exu-
berance of youth, eclipsed those of the Old Destour through an in-
tensified campaign of mass education: organizing youth groups, holding
demonstrations, and establishing a party organization throughout the
country. •'
Despite periods of suppression by the French, the Neo-Destour
realized French contributions to Tunisia. Though contesting the
colonial status quo in much stronger terms than their conservative
rivals, the Destourists, the Neo-Destour leaders did not develop an
obstructionist mentality.
The Neo-Destour l s belief in a moderate approach can further be
seen in the absence of religious fanaticism, but keeping some identifi-
cation with religious observances. Perhaps the moderation and
pragmatism of the Neo-Destour before independence is best summed up
by Lorna Eahn when she states:
79ciement f the Neo Destour," Tunisia ;
l££ Z2lii :.^i£ ££ !i£ll-r . 1. - • ud, pp. 7f^o.
donalist Movement " Niddie
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In addition to providing flexibility in dealing with France
and other countries, lack of QOKa&taent to any program save
independence and modernization meant that the Neo-Destour
was able to enroll, and to retain as members, almost all
politically-minded citizens except members of the small and
conservative 'Vieux Destcur', occasional Communists, and
those who for personal reasons opposed any changes in the
status quo. Knowing that party policies would always be ad-
justed to satisfy the wishes of the majority, rather than
party members having to conform to the dictates of a given
platform, Destourians acquired the habit of arbitrating dif-
ferences \*ithin party ranks, instead of founding opposition
movements dedicated to achieving one specific objective or
other
. .
.
Most people thought of themselves as ' Tunisians T
considered the Keo-Destour their party and Bourguiba their
leader. This cohesion was to prove to be probably, the
country^ biggest asset in the coming years."1
In the early 19^0' s several internal challenges faced the I'eo-
Destour which led to greater cohesion of the Tunisian society than
party organization alone could provide. With the return of Taalbi
after fifteen years of exile, the Destour tried a comeback. The Keo-
Destour immediately discredited Taalbi in all but the old elites eyes.
After this, as long as the Neo-Destour paid lip service to Islam,
danger from the conservative element was small.
Another challenge came from the Tunisian Communist Party which
was never strong in Tunisia except in the labor movement after the
Second World War. The leaders of the Neo-Destour had to combat the
Communist-dominated CGT for the support of the Tunisian workers and
thus wanted to create an autonomous Tunisian union. In January, 19^6,
Farhat Hached, supported by the Neo-Destour, founded a new all-Tunisian
R1
Lorna Hahn, "Tunisia: Pragmatism and Progress," Middle Sast
Journal, Vol. XVI, No. 1 (Winter, 1962), pp. 19-20.
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ration, the Genoral Union :kers (UGTT). The UGTT
almost immediately attracted a i slim workors away from
tho European-dominated CGT. ation of the DGTT with
International Confederation : .ons, the i-sue of
Communism was settled once and for all the nationalist ra
82
ore independence.
The development of other national organizations before
independence farther shows Tunisian cohesion under the Keo-Destour.
o-Gestour helped in the organizing of the Tunisian Union of
Shopkeepers and Artisians (tJTAC)., the Gener 1 Union of Tunisian
Farmers (UGAT), the General Union of Tunisian Students, and the
Tunisian Assoc: i : - of Chambers of Commerce. Many other organiza-
tions were also set-up such as the Muslim Scouts and Muslim Youth.
"Thus, -e independence a virtual political system already existed
. . .
.Unlike most emerging nations, Tunisia already had its modern
interest groups to articulate the special grievances of various
sectors toward the colonial regime.' Moreover, they had a history of
cooperation with the dominant pa:- ' t would be a vital precedent
in the pursuit of nation- 1 interests above group interests after
independence." ^
le role that Bourguiba played in -_'.. these activities is hard
to overstate. National identity embodied within the Keo-Destour was
i, op. c p. 175.
ore, Tunisia Sir p. 37.
60
by Bourguiba. Hie exc; il loaderchip was crucial in
forging a new national consciousness. At the same time shortsigbrb
nch colonial policies also wc to Bourp^iiba's advanta ;e.
Bourguiba and tho Neo-Destour bee . ... - of the shared ex-
periences of t . -- , :>nial : ggle, ;inually articulatinj
tho symbols of national identity.
.
Of the period before indo nee Clc: . Moore has stated:
Le time tl Neo-Destour attained self-government, its
•thesis seemed relatively complete. The party had imposed
upon the naturally .neous society a new modernist con-
isus of a Western-educated elite. The consensus not only
survived the challenges of the traditionalists and the Com-
_ists; the long struggle with France also assured that the
consensus penetrated through the society as a whole
. . .
perhaps more Ln any e.:.ergin nation, the colonial situ-
ation in Tunisia had set up the conditions for stable and
sive single party rule. 8^
With the opening of the 1950' s the Neo-Destour increased its
drive for independence from the French, In October, 1951, a manifesto
requesting self-govern sis. was submitted to the U. N. by
a delegation headed by Bourguiba. The aims of independence were well
expressed by Bourguiba. " t Tunisia demands is the status of an in-
dependent and sovereign country tied to France by a freely negotiated
treaty of alliance which guarantees to the latter its strategic, eco-
nomic, and cultural interests. The Government of Tunisia will be
national, constitutional and democratic, under the aegis of the
bid
., pp. 39-^0.
alegitimate Sovereign of the count:";: .... It is not administrative
posts we want. govern our country."
After a quick turn of events ir 1955* Tunisia was granted
independence in 1956. Bourguiba and t! 3-DestouT wore suprei
.
With the people behind
. they were not; ready to progress as a na-
tion. But one big hurdle to Bourguiba appeared in the person of Ben
Youssef, general secretary of the c-Destour until 1955. Just prior
to independence and immediately following, Youssef took a strong pro-
Islamic end pro-Arab stand in contrast to that of Bourguiba and the
majority of the Neo-Destour. Violence be : -en these two factions
erupted. Undoubtedly the absence during these transitional months of
a coherent administration for law and order aggravated this situation,
but resort to violence in competitive situations until this time often
marked Tunisian politics.
Youssefism was overcome, but not until it had crucial consequences
for political development. In the short-run the prestige and political
power of those that had combated Youssefism was increased. But in the
long-run Youssefism demonstrated a need for stronger organisation than
had been shown by the Neo-Destour. The liberal and orderly competition
of different political groupings no longer became a realistic alterna-
txve uo one-party rule. On June 1, 1959 a presidential constitution
ivlin, 00. cit
. , p. 1??.
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,
p. 80.
2promulgated which sot up . ;y rule un< -•
Bourguiba—who has been
In any single-party sy
,
it is i '; to draw rigid
distinctions between J . In - He Thirty was
supposed to represent the people, t the govern.'-. ' . was ali;o sup-
posed to emanate from the genera is an ambi^ous relation-
ship was f between party and government. If the Neo-Des tour was
to play both an integrating ana a representive role, such ambiguity
was necessary. The !-2co-Destour "... could mobilize popular support
for government policies while representing (to a degree) the interests
and aspirations of the rank and file. For the former task an efficient
and disciplined apparatus was required: for the latter, a measure of
internal discussion, compromise, and conciliation .... The Neo-
Destour*s word was not law, whatever its influence upon the government.
Although the party's mission might, as Bourguiba suggested be »perma-
nent, ! .^o-Destour did not become a cult or an end in itself."
To give government leaders greater control over the party
apparatus, the party was reorganised two years after independence. This
reorj tion reassured that the party which had created the state
would be subservient to the state. Again in 1963-6^- the party was
reorganized, but as Vrt to increase popular participation by
democratizing its structure and increasing its influence uoon
87ibid
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the ... - • i
t
nor the r
socialist ideolo;:y gave tho party doc:' isdiction over govern-
ment, policies,
1953 reorganization, ti ... . '. 00 branches
of the Neo-Destoi \ Th I •« iches w re the great source of
>ur strength. They serve as the local organ (fifty branches
alone in Tunis) of social irite r an by bringing together diverse
factions and classes. They also serve the important task of filling
the vacuum left by th y of tr „s. The branch
is the 3 of transmitting the demands and grievances of the people
to the party apparatus, while particij En .: local govern] nt
is encouraged by the branch. Educating people into the political sys-
1 is also carried out through the branch. 3y explaining the signifi-
tce of government projects and trait-.. «ty cadres for further
political responsibilities, "the party mobilizes the people.
..: nore could be written about the Neo-Destour—called the
Destourian Socialist Party since the party congress of 19&J-. But the
above should give a basis for comparison of Tunisia and Syria. To
this we now turn.
Conclusion
dependence for Tunisia cane a decade after independence had
been granted to Syria. This difference of a decade has had several
... P- - -
%bid., p. 132.
%jos for both Syria and Tunisia cone-' political development.
Syria worked for her in b with riving forco t
was found in Tunisia. In Syr
,
inc pen< :e movement brought
little lasting cohesion becc;>. - -ochial and non-
modernist attitudes. Con: .'_y, divisive particularism, re on
the Syrian political scene, possibly strengthened by inde nee.
The independence movement in Tunisia was a sustained effort for
twenty years, in which time the Neo-Destour Party became the nationalist
embodiment. Leaders of the Neo-Destour, Bourguiba in particular,
gained the sound backing of the Tunisian people with their forward and
_as.
The simple fact that independence was won by the Tunisians from
the Jronoh principally on their own helped to induce a lasting feeling
of cohesion and integration. But the homogeneity found in Tunisia
before the independence movement began, undoubtedly provided the basis
of stronger cohesion brought on by the nationalist struggle.
contrast, Syria had a heterogeneous culture, which the years
before and after independence provided for a fragmented political
culture. Also, the effort needed for independence was not strong
enough to be a lasting value for cohesion and integration. By viewing
Syria c:'.d Tunisia, it b that the length and degree of time needed
for both to gai . their independence had consequences of lasting
importance for political development.
st 21cc in Syria . , Qy organisation with
;
attribut not undergror
. ifore independence. Since this
6S
;
for i et it would be difficult to
connect it too closely to the d elf, i.e., the
culmination of processes of social, political change.
Parties after independenc all . >rge from their earlier
settings and become active. But these j i ties, as is so often found
where parties have been clandestine, f. to produce responsible
leader. lad little
.tical compromise. Thus
the five major part.'
_ after independence became mainly inde-
pendent variables affecting political development rather than the
outgrowth of the development process.
The rise of the Neo-Destour in Tunisia can be seen ae an
outgrowth of the development process, but at the same time as the
most important indepenc snt variable emerging in the development
process. Viewing the Neo-Destour in the light ox the Young Tunisians,
the Destour, and French modernisation, it should be realized that all
three of these factors helped lead to the creation of the Neo-Destour.
Also, the place the Heo-Destour occupies in the "colonial dialectic"
is another indication of the party's place in the development process.
The Neo-Destour early in its existence worked to gain public
port. Throughout the It mty ye :. has continued this
policy, even increasing its efforts as seen through reorganisation,
education, and increase,! voting. With a strong eelief in man, the
party has been an effective wi . to exercise power—specially
at *ke
-
sr levels. E ties reinforce both support
rtiedpation.
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In Syria, both the rational and Feople ! s parties tended to
reinforce divisive particularism—specially on the geographic scale.
Though the People's Farty worked at times for larger voting partici-
pation, this effort was probably done with the idea of benefits to
the party. The Syrian Social Nationalist Party, because of its strict
ideology and somewhat Christian leanings, was another force that led
to continued fragmentation. The Ea'th and Syrian Communist Party made
great efforts to gain popular support. Though succeeding to some
extent, both parties in the process alienated certain segments of the
society. With so many forces operating, little cohesion and integra-
tion into the political system appeared. The intensity of these
forces is seen when H. B. Sharabi writes, "From 19^9 until the union
with Egypt in 1958, at least five forces, five attitudes, were en-
gaged in the deadly struggle for political ascendency in Syria; all
of them manifested themselves through, or in collaboration with, the
military establishment which throughout this period was inextricably
90involved in the struggle."
Farties with a strong ideology that are trying to affect
behavioral and attitudinal change are undoubtedly mobilist. Under
this category in Syria could be placed the SSI-IP, the Moslem Brother-
hood, the Syrian Communist Party, and the Ba'th Party—all wanted and
9°H. B. Sharabi, Governments and Politics of the 1-Iiddle East
in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
196177 PP. 127-123.
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called for a different form of Syrian society. Part of the success
both the 3a' th and Communist parties had over the SSNP can be traced
to a willingness to adhere less adamantly to their respective ideologies,
i.e., they were Killing to resort to adaptive measures when needed.
No doubt the Ba'th became much more proficient at this than the
Communists. A quick look at the Arab-Israeli War of the late 19&0'
s
should verify this point.
3oth the National and People's parties had little ideology and
few mobilist aspects. But it is difficult to label these parties
adaptive either, since both parties did not seek widespread support
except among the landed families. Perhaps the closest one could label
these parties would be sectarian in nature and thought.
Since the Ba'th has had the greatest success of parties in
Syria, and the Ba'th appears to have mixed adaptive tendencies with
mobilist orientations to a greater extent than ether Syrian parties,
the conclusion might be reached that a party which follows a path
between a strong mobilist ard adaptive classification has a better
chance for continuance and rule than those that do not, i.e., in
developing countries. 9* A look at Tunisia should help in verification.
As seen earlier the reo-Destcur has continually followed a
pragmatic path. But this path before 1956 was led by the thought of
^Verification of this conclusion is difficult in Syria because
of the continued military involvement in the government. For the
extent of military involvement and its affects in Syria see Torrey,
Syrian Politics and the Military ; Scale, The Struckle for Syria ; and
The I.Hilary in the Kiddie "hast , ed. Sydney iiettleton Fisher (Columbus:
Ohio State University Press, 19o3).
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independence, modernization, and a firm belief in nan. Though the
former has been achieved, the belief in man and modernization has
continued. These points have been the loose guiding ideology- of the
Neo-Destour, coupled now with "Keo-Destourian socialism." The party-
has been adaptive when needed in the areas of religion, land reform,
and local politics. Thus without losing its sense of direction, the
Neo-Destour has followed a course charted between the poles of
mobilism and adaptivism. Its continued existence and popular support
should verify its success.
The ascendency of the Neo-Destour in the 1930' s over all other
indigenous political parties and groupings has meant the party
developed within the internal setting. Though the Neo-Destour was
suppressed by the colonial authorities on many occasions, it con-
tinued to work within the established framework when possible. This
action, together with the moderate approach to independence gave the
Neo-Destour many of the qualities associated with internally developed
parties, though the competitive aspect is still missing in the system.
In Syria, the National Eloc is all that would be considered as
developing internally. But after independence it split and the factions
took on external party characteristics. The other Syrian parties,
i.e., Ea'th, Brotherhood, SSFP, and Communist, can be classified as
externally developed parties. Consequently, most of these parties had
or developed a strong ideology where little room for compromise existed.
This led to a radicalization and intensification of the competitive
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process itself. Only in the 19^7 elections could all parties
participate on at least somewhat of an equal level. After this, the
party in power was likely to suppress all other parties—or at least
those most hostile to it. The only real r.eans left for gaining power,
was through clandestine operations and involvement in the military.
At the present time both Syria and Tunisia are operating
under one-party systems. This has been true of Tunisia since 1956
and Syria since 196l (the break-up of the Arab Socialist Union).
Before 1961 Syria ranged from a virtual military dictatorship (where
the Arab Liberation Movement was tried and failed) to a multi-party
system immediately after independence. The ruling Ba'th Party now
operates in an authoritarian system, where it is the authoritarian
party.
As noted earlier, an authoritarian party has drawbacks when
working with the aggregation function. Syria, still predominantly
agrarian, lacks the urbanisation, industrialization, and educational
levels to fully sustain effective and operational as secnational
interests groups. Rather, a high degree of anomic and institutional
interest groups are found. Thus much of the aggregation function
resides within the Ea'th Party where formulation of policy alterna-
tives is decided. The lack of effective associational interest groups
in Syria is not entirely the fault of the Ba'th, but .whether the Ba'th
since the early 1960's has attempted to increase the number, organiza-
tion, and effectiveness of associational interest groups has not been
determined by this writer.
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In Tunisia, where the Neo-Bestour operates in a dominant non-
authoritarian system, the aggregating situation is quite different.
The low amount of institutional and anonic interest groups reflects
the effective aggregative party system, the lack of a strongly divided
political culture, and the effectiveness of associational interest
groups. The strong, active part played by the Neo-Destour in the
establishment of associational interest groups was pointed out earlier.
Consequently, aggregation from these groups to and through the party
has removed the need for strong anomic and institutional articulation.
Mention was made in an earlier section of the importance that
political elites play in the dominant non-authoritarian system. In
Tunisia these elites are committed to a process of political moderniza-
tion and helped bring into being functionally specific associational
interest groups. Consequently, relative stability has existed as
found in few other developing nations.
If we look at the "sack-of-potatoes" problem associated with
integration in Syria and Tunisia, we again find a large difference.
The natural homogeneity of Tunisia and the early policies and actions
of the Keo-Destour meant that this problem was not to be a stumbling
block to development after independence. Thus the Keo-Destour was
able to concentrate on a political style which could bridge and lessen
the gulf between the national elites and others within the system.
In Syria at time of independence, the fragmented political
culture meant that this problem was still to be overcome. But the
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appearance of a number of strongly ideological parties hindered the
solution to this problem, a problem which still exists today. Thus
any hope of overcoming what we have called the "homogenisation"
problem rests to a large degree on overcoming fragmentation first.
The basic process of overcoming cultural and political
fragmentation lies within the socialisation process. If the same
political attitudes and values can be inculcated into the society,
fragmentation will likely be mitigated. But the political culture
is also continued through the socialisation process. With many parties
holding power at different tines in Syria, the socialisation process
never continued in the same order. Thus the system was confronted
with no integrating, lasting socialisation processes. The only real
socializing aspsct was one of power, i.e., the party with greatest
military support ruled.
With the Ba'th in power for the last six years, it may become
the forca that is needed to break down fragmentation and strengthen
national integration. Since it operates in an authoritarian system,
its working through educational and vocational structures may facili-
tate an integrating socialization process. But for socialization to
be effective in the long run, the Ba'th must develop a large sense
of public support, even if limiting political participation.
Most people in Tunisia accept the Neo-Destour. Furthermore,
the high rate of literacy enables widespread support for the system
to be taught in the schools. Since the Neo-Destour does not use
7t
n or foster a climate of mutual cion .. order to . . in
itself, the pooplc are socialize* - whore sue:, »fs ccc
not valued. Whereas there hai binuing socialization proc
over the last several decades in Tunisia, > in Sy ia has
never followed t 3 path for Ion , the path of violence.
In the movement for independence, the Neo-Destour was effect! -
in mobilizing the Tunisian . The support gained from t
Tunisia:-, people through the i ce movement has meant continued
support, or at least litt'. istance to the I .c- a •. The need
for mobilizing the people, done largely anch, has be-
3 one of persuading the people of needs for modernization. Tunisia
has been lucky with its pluralis ; . • by in t -re has always teen
support for the system. If the situation had been different, the
I d-I 3tour may have been hard-pressed to retain its pluralist
•acter.
The Ba'th has made good use of both the call for Arab Nationalism
and the defeat of Israel to mobilize the Syrian people. Because the
socializing process in Syria cannot play the role it does in more
developed countries, the Ba'th emphasizes mobilization for greater
port and integration. But the same process means greater repression
by the Ba'th within the systc. ..
Syria and 1 i tend to support the hypothesis advanced by
Roy 3 r: .is "that the greater >hasis upon mobilization, the
?3
less open and democratic fee system; the greater the emphasis upon
integration, the more repressive the party and the greater the likeli-
hood of a one-party system." In Syria ;;here there is great emphasis
on mobilisation, the system is authoritarian. Where more emphasis
is on the socialisation function in Tunisia, the system is more open
and democratic. Since integration has already been achieved to a
large extent in Tunisia, party repression is almost non-existent and
there are signs that the one-party system is loosening. In contrast,
through its emphasis on integration, the Ea'th remains repressive.
The repressive aspects connected with the Ea'th are closely
connected with participation. Partially for fear of losing the posi-
tion they have gained in the system, the 3a' th leaders fear active
increased participation in the political process. Input influence
is restricted, consequently a subject oriented society exists with
strong parochial manifestations. Never has there been large scale
voting participation, or even participation in the different parts
of the political system. Possibly, increased integration through
mobilisation is needed before effective participation can develop.
In this sense, the Ba'th may not be hindering political development
by holding participation at a low level. But, since participation
must increase at some point for political development to continue,
the Ba'th may have to broaden participation—both in number and depth.
At the local level in Tunisia, the ITeo-Destour has continually
encouraged greater participation, not only in voting, but also in
7*»
actively engaging in local activities. Thus on the lower levels
almost full admission into the political system exists. But the
higher the level of government, the lower is realistic participation.
Even though the guise of participation exists at the higher levels,
there is in actuality only limited admission. Thus the government
and Neo-Destour want a feeling of legitimacy to develop without
giving up control of power. Whether this policy will continue its
same path in the future can be only speculation on this writer's part,
since there can be no guarantee that moderation will not give way to
extremism if those espousing the moderate coxrrse are unable to pro-
duce results.
In Syria, the parties which had mobilist aspects could have
played an important role in integration of the political system but
failed. One reason is that these parties remained rigid in doctrine
and structure. But perhaps the most important reason is that these
parties were more interested in integrating people into the party
than into the political system. A continuation of this lack of
political integration can be seen in the low participation and
socializatioii into the political system today.
With the fragmented culture at the time of independence, one
must wonder if the structure of government that Syria adopted was in
its best interest for aiding political development. Time has surely
shown it not to be. The structure was there but the essence of oper-
ating that structure was absent—a facet all too common in the newly-
independent nations.
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The Ba'th with amy support has the chance to bee one a
dynamic factor in political development for Syria. If the party can
maintain stability long enough to let political development take an
active hold, perhaps political development may have the chance to
become self-generating in Syria. But in any case, the road for Syria
appears to be long and difficult.
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ABSTRACT
purpose of this study was to examine the affect that
political parties can have toward . -1 development, primary in
developing countries. The study was comparative in that two countries,
Syria and Tunisia, were used for analysis. These two countries were
chosen not only for their many likenesses, but also because of their
vast differences.
To be considered a political j - this study minimal
requirements were established: organization and a conscious effort on
the part of the organization to gain electoral and/or popular support.
A cos . itive approach was esta- d as the means and method
for study. Basically this involved a functional apparatus, but coor-
dinated with this were structural components. This approach was
easily linked to the concept of political development in that political
development was characterised by: i) structural differentiation and
functional specificity, 2) a greater capacity to cope with demands
and control conflict, and, 3) the population as a whole acquires a con-
tributing status in place of a subject orientation.
Parties were classified in several ways helpful to developmental
analysis. The mcbilist idaptive classification helped shew the
differences between ideologically-oriented parties attempting behavioral
and attitudinal change, and those parties which take a more pragmatic
cf ga.
2Another classification was made betueen competitive and
non-competitive parties, vhich were shown to be related to the systems
in which they operated, lion-competitive parties were further divided
into totalitarian, authoritarian, and pluralistic one-party types.
The pluralist party lacks a strong commitment to ideology which sug-
gested that this type of party may be beneficial for dealing with per-
sistent traditional values and become prime mediators between the
elites and masses. Both authoritarian and totalitarian parties were
shown to lack the ability of playing a mediating role except through
force, but both have the capability of effectively dealing with con-
flict and demands—though highly different from the pluralist party
approach.
The functional framework revolved around the broad function of
integration. To aid analysis this function was subdivided into the
functions of socialization, mobilisation, and participation. These
three functions were then analyzed in relation to the above named
types of parties, and the interaction and consequences for political
development were explored.
With the framework established, focus turned to the countries
of Syria and Tunisia. Syria's past, plagued with continual unrest
and instability emanating from many factors, has seen coup follow
coup, each bringing a different party to power. Because succession
has never been regularized, the party in power usually acquired
authoritarian traits. Viewing Syria verified to a large extent the
limits established in the func\:' k Ian rties
to political development, W; th party becoming stronger
ideologically oriented, the ft political development
remains vague, if not pesi ic,
nisia, in qontr to S ....... red stabi:.:. . internal
. .ty. The Neo-I nly party cince inde-
\dence was granted in 195e. But Syrian] ^ties, the Keo-
.d the sup] . ... >ugh its "luraiist
roach
*
ttle doubt --ras left in the ] s that Tt ..a had
out-distanced Syria .cal - it ....... uestion
remains, m se countries? She
conclusion re. study is i ,li£3 I yes. '. d ibt the
s in -of develop-
other factors affe r m ] . ap as much.
Thus political parties are not only indep indent \ 1. affecting
political development, but also - a e itgrcwth of the development
process itself.
